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Abstract
In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement
of ’voting power’ either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features
two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters’ behavior.
We propose a simple model in which the voters’ behavior is summarized by a probability
distribution over all vote conﬁgurations. This basic model, at once simpler and more
general that other probabilistic models, provides a clear conceptual common basis to
reinterpret coherently from a uniﬁed point of view diﬀerent power indices and some related
game theoretic notions, as well as a wider perspective for a dispassionate assessment of
the power indices themselves, their merits and their limitations.
Keywords: Voting rules, voting power, decisiveness, success, power indices, simple
games, probabilistic models.
21 Introduction
The diﬃcult issues raised by the enlargement of the European Union, specially in con-
nection with the EU’s institutions’ decision-making have reached the public opinion (see,
e.g., Galloway (2001)), and power indices have come into focus of renewed scientiﬁci n t e r -
est. There is an open debate about their meaning and their suitability to assess voting
situations in general and the EU decision-making in particular. On the one hand, the
lack of compellingness from a positive or a normative point of view of the axiomatic foun-
dations of power indices has to be acknowledged. On the other hand, the existence and
misuse of several indices without a clear justiﬁcation is confusing and does not contribute
to their credit. Finally, power indices are often criticized (see, e.g., Garrett and Tsebelis
(1999, 2001)) on the basis that the only information they take into account is the voting
procedure, while the voters’ preferences and other contextual relevant information, which
clearly inﬂuence the role of voters in actual decision making, are ignored. In our opinion
most of this sometimes passionate argument is often based on misunderstanding and lack
of a clear conceptual basis. This paper intends to provide a clear and simple model that
may serve as a conceptual term of reference for a dispassionate assessment of the power
indices themselves, their merits and their limitations.
Since the only recently vindicated Penrose (1946) and the later but much more popular
Shapley-Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965) indices, there exists a vast literature on power
indices and their applications to political science. Apart from the two best known ones,
some other power indices1 and related concepts have been proposed (Rae (1969), Coleman
(1971, 1986), Deegan and Packel (1978), Johnston (1978), Holler and Packel (1983), K¨ onig
and Br¨ auninger (1998)). On the other hand, there are also to be found in the cooperative
game theoretic literature some ’solution’ concepts, as semivalues (Weber, 1979, 1988),
weak (weighted or not) semivalues (Calvo and Santos, 2000) or some coalitional values
(Owen (1977, 1982)) that can be seen as extensions of the concept of power index when
restricted to simple games (see e.g., Carreras and Maga˜ na (1994), Laruelle and Valenciano
(2001b), Carreras, Freixas and Puente (2002)).
There are basically two approaches to deal with power indices and their game theoretic
extensions: the axiomatic approach and the probabilistic one. In the ﬁrst approach, each
power index is interpreted as the unique measure embodying a set of properties that
characterizes it. This approach has attracted so far much attention in the literature.
Since Dubey’s (1975) ﬁrst axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik index on the domain
of simple games and that of Dubey and Shapley (1979) of the Banzhaf index, several
axiomatizations have been proposed of these two indices, as well as of some of other power
1See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) for a recent critical review.
3indices and related game theoretic extensions. However, most of these axiomatizations
pay little attention to the compellingness or even to the meaning of the axioms in terms
of the voting situations underlying simple games2.
An alternative approach consists of a direct probabilistic interpretation of the involved
concept. This approach received considerable attention in the 70’s (see for instance Niemi
and Weisberg (1972)), but its appeal seems to have declined in the political science liter-
ature (see notwithstanding Straﬃn (1977, 1982, 1988) and Barry (1980)). While in the
game theoretic literature the probabilistic interpretation is disregarded or artiﬁcially done
in terms of every player’s subjective probability distribution over the coalitions she can
join.
In this paper we propose a simple model which includes the two separate basic ingre-
dients in a voting situation: the voting rule and the voters. The voting rule speciﬁes when
a proposal is to be accepted or rejected depending on the resulting vote conﬁguration.
Voters, the second ingredient in a voting situation, are included via their voting behavior,
which is summarized by a distribution of probability over the vote conﬁgurations. This
probability distribution, a black box like ingredient in our model, obviously depends on
the preferences of the actual voters over the issues they will have to decide upon, the
likelihood of these issues being proposed, the agenda-setting issue, etc. But the minimal-
istic simplicity of this model, avoiding any further elements in it, has some conceptual
advantages. As we will see it allows formulations of a great conceptual transparency and
generality, rid of dispensable ingredients or discussable assumptions.
Within this framework, at once simpler and more general than some well-known prob-
abilistic models, as it is shown in the paper, we re-examine the concepts of ’success,’ and
’decisiveness’ that can be traced a long way back in the literature, as well as some condi-
tional variants. This setting allows a simple and precise reformulation of these concepts
as probabilities which depend on the voting rule and the voters’ voting behavior. In this
way previous purely normative notions are conceptually extended to more general pos-
itive/descriptive notions, providing a wider perspective to interpret some power indices
(once adequately reformulated and generalized) and related concepts form a common point
of view, shedding light on their meaning and relations, and their normative value or their
lack of it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the ﬁrst ingredient
in any voting situation: the voting rule. In section 3, we deﬁne the primitive ex post
versions of the concepts of success and decisiveness. Section 4 incorporates to the model
2An exception is Laruelle and Valenciano (2001a), where a transparent characterization of both indices
is provided and the lack of compelling arguments to choose any of them on solely axiomatic grounds is
stressed.
4the voters’ behavior. Section 5 provides the ex ante extension of the concepts introduced
in section 3, as well as some conditional variations of these concepts. In section 6 the
positive/descriptive possibilities of the model are brieﬂy discussed. Section 7 treats the
special case in which all vote conﬁgurations are considered equiprobable with normative
purposes, showing how some power indices emerge as particular cases of the general notions
introduced in section 5. In section 8 other power indices, as well as some game-theoretic
related concepts are examined in the light of the model. Section 9 addresses the comparison
with previous probabilistic models. Section 10 summarizes the main conclusions of the
paper.
2V o t i n g r u l e s
A voting situation is a situation in which a set of voters faces decision-making according
to the speciﬁcations of a voting procedure. Thus, there are two separate ingredients: the
voters and what we will call the voting rule. In this section we concentrate in this second
element.
A voting rule is a well-speciﬁed procedure to make decisions by the vote of any kind
of committee of a certain number of members. If the number of voters is n, the diﬀerent
seats will be labelled 1,2,..,n,a n dN will denote this set of labels. Voters will be labelled
by their seats’ labels. Once a proposal is submitted to the committee, voters will cast
votes. A vote conﬁguration is a possible or conceivable result of a vote, that lists the vote
cast by the voter occupying each seat. We will consider only rules that assimilate any vote
diﬀerent from a ’yes’ (abstention included) to a ’no’3. Under this assumption there are 2n
possible conﬁgurations of votes, and each conﬁguration can be represented by the set of
labels of the ’yes’-voters’ seats. So, we refer as the vote conﬁguration S to the result of a
vote where only the voters in S vote ’yes’, while those in N\S, vote (or are assimilated to)
’no’. The cardinal of S will be denoted by s. Sometimes we will say that a conﬁguration
S ’contains i’t om e a nt h a ti’s vote was ’yes’, that is, i ∈ S.
An N-voting rule is fully speciﬁed by the set of vote conﬁgurations that would lead
to the passage of a proposal. These conﬁgurations will be called winning conﬁgurations.
In what follows W will denote the set of winning conﬁgurations representing an N-voting
r u l e . I tw i l lb ea s s u m e dt h a tav o t i n gr u l es a t i s ﬁes these requirements: (i) N ∈ W;( i i )
∅ / ∈ W; (iii) If S ∈ W,t h e nT ∈ W for any T containing S;a n d( i v )I fS ∈ W then
N\S/ ∈ W. The last condition prevents the passage of a proposal and its negation if they
3See Freixas and Zwicker (2002) for a more general notion of voting rule that admits vote conﬁgurations
with ’diﬀerent levels of approval’.
5were supported by S and N\S, respectively4.
Let VRN denote the set of all such N-voting rules, each of them identiﬁed with the
set W of winning conﬁgurations that speciﬁes it. Some particular voting procedures that
will be alluded later are the following. WN will denote the unanimity rule,i nw h i c ht h e
only winning conﬁguration is the unanimous ’yes’. Seat i’s dictatorship is the voting rule
in which the decision always coincides with voter on seat i’s (i.e., the dictator’s) vote:
Wi = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S}. We will also refer as a ’null voter’s seat’ in a voting rule, to a seat
such that the result of any vote is never inﬂuenced by the vote of the voter sitting on it.
Namely, in a procedure W,s e a ti is a null voter’s seat if for any S containing i, S ∈ W if
and only if S\{i} ∈ W.W ew i l ld r o pi’s brackets in S\{i} or S ∪ {i}.
3 Success and decisiveness ex post
To speak of success or failure, decisiveness or irrelevance, or any other feature concerning
the role played in a voting situation requires voters. Let the voters enter the scene and
vote on a given proposal. A vote conﬁguration emerges, and the voting rule prescribes
the ﬁnal outcome, passage or rejection of the proposal. If the proposal is accepted (resp.,
rejected), only the voters who have voted in favor (resp., against) have had success5.T h u s ,
being successful means having the outcome -acceptance or rejection- one voted for. We
will say that a successful voter has been decisive in a vote if her vote was crucial for her
success; that is, had she changed her vote the outcome would have been diﬀerent. This is
the basic notion behind a variety of concepts of ’voting power.’
Formally we have the following ex post boolean notions. ’Ex post’ as dependent on the
voting rule used to make decisions and the resulting conﬁguration of votes after av o t ei s
cast; and ’boolean’ in the sense that there is no quantiﬁcation in these notions, a voter
just may or may not be successful or decisive.
Deﬁnition 1 After a decision is made according to an N-voting rule W,i ft h er e s u l t i n g
conﬁguration of votes is S,a n di ∈ N,
(i) Voter i is said to have been successful (for brief, i is successful in (W, S)), if the
decision coincides with voter i’s vote, that is, iﬀ
(i ∈ S ∈ W)o r( i/ ∈ S/ ∈ W). (1)
(ii) Voter i is said to have been decisive (for brief, i is decisive in (W,S)), if voter i
4In certain cases, e.g., if the rule is used to include issues on the agenda, this condition is not required.
5The expression is due to Barry (1980), but the notion can be traced back under diﬀerent names at
least to Rae (1969) (see also Brams and Lake (1978), and Straﬃn, Davis and Brams (1981)).
6was successful and i’s vote was critical for it, that is, iﬀ
(i ∈ S ∈ W and S\i/ ∈ W)o r( i/ ∈ S/ ∈ W and S ∪ i ∈ W). (2)
The two6 ex post concepts introduced depend on the resulting vote conﬁguration and
the voting rule which prescribes whether such a conﬁguration is winning or not. Can these
concepts be deﬁned ex ante, that is, before voters cast their vote? If what the voters will
vote is known with certainty, the answer is obvious. Otherwise, only in a few cases a
partial answer is possible. For instance, a dictator will surely be successful and decisive.
And a null voter will never be decisive. But in general, the knowledge of the voting rule
is not suﬃcient to determine ex ante the success and decisiveness of a voter. Indeed a
voter’s success and decisiveness depend on the voting rule but also on how she and the
other voters will vote. In other words, they depend also on all voters’ behavior.
4 Voting behavior
In general what voters are going to vote is not known in advance. Nevertheless, an
estimation of the likelihood of diﬀerent vote conﬁgurations from the available information
is always possible. We assume thus that for any vote conﬁguration S that may arise we
know -or at least have an estimate of- the probability p(S)t h a tv o t e r sv o t ei ns u c haw a y
that S emerges. In this way we incorporate into the model the voters’ voting behavior
via a probability distribution over all possible vote conﬁgurations. In other words, the
elementary events are the vote conﬁgurations in 2N. As the number of them is ﬁnite (2n),
we can represent any such a probability distribution by a map p :2 N → R that associates
with each vote conﬁguration S its probability of occurrence p(S). That is, p(S)g i v e st h e
probability that voters in S vote ’yes’, and those in N\S vote ’no’. Of course, 0 ≤ p(S) ≤ 1




Let PN denote the set of all such distributions of probability over 2N. This set can be
interpreted as the set of all conceivable probabilistic voting behaviors of N-voters (yes/no
voters, in fact, as we assume that there is no abstention) within the present setting. These
probabilities permit in principle to reﬂect the relative proximity of voters’ preferences,
their relationships, or any contextual information available that conditions their voting
behavior, summarizing it in probabilistic terms. It is worth noting that in this model the
6Barry (1980) referred also to the successful but irrelevant voters as ’lucky’. That is, a voter i has been
lucky in (W, S)i ﬀ
(i ∈ S ∈ W and S\i ∈ W)o r( i/ ∈ S/ ∈ Wand S ∪ i/ ∈ W).
The three concepts are obviously related: a successful voter must be either decisive or lucky.
7Mind here ’∅’ does not denote the empty event, but the unanimous ’no’, so that p(∅) > 0 is possible.
7event ’voter i votes ”yes”’ is not necessarily independent of the other voters’ votes8,t h i s
is only a particular case within our model.
Now the model is complete: an N-voting situation is speciﬁed by a pair (W,p), where
W ∈VRN is a voting rule and p ∈ PN represents a probability distribution over the
vote conﬁgurations. Mind this second ingredient in the model is a black box probabilistic
summary of the voters’ behavior. In section 6 we will come back to this point and discuss
how to ﬁll in this box either for applied or theoretical purposes.
5 Success and decisiveness ex ante
5.1 The two basic notions
The ex ante version in a voting situation of the concepts introduced in section 4 in their
primitive ex post version is now possible. By ex ante9, we mean before the voters cast their
votes, but once they occupied their seats. Ex ante, success and decisiveness can be deﬁned
as the probability of being successful and decisive, respectively. It suﬃces to replace in
t h ee xp o s td e ﬁnitions (1) and (2) the sure conﬁguration S by the random conﬁguration
of votes speciﬁed by the distribution of probability over the vote conﬁgurations p.T h i s
yields the following extension of these concepts.
Deﬁnition 2 Let (W,p) be an N-voting situation, where W i st h ev o t i n gr u l et ob eu s e d
and p ∈ PN is the probability distribution over vote conﬁgurations, and let i ∈ N:
(i) Voter i’s (ex ante) success is the probability that i is successful:







(ii) Voter i’s (ex ante) decisiveness is the probability that i is decisive:









8An assumption already considered very irrealistic by Niemi and Weisberg (1972).
9In the London Workshop in Voting Power Analysis (11-12/08/02) organized by R. Fara and M. Ma-
chover a controversy arised about the use of the term ’a priori’ (and consequently ’a posteriori’). In
previous versions of the two papers in which this work is based we used this term referring to the situation
before the voters cast their votes, but once they occupied their seats, or at least some information about
them is in principle available. While the most common use of this term refers to the situation previous
to both things and ignoring anything about the voters preferences, relationships, or any possibly relevant
contextual information beyond the voting rule itself (see notwithstanding, among others, Owen (1982),
Calvo and Lasaga (1997), or Braham and Steﬀen (2002) for a non that ’radical’ use of the term). In order
to avoid any confusion and any further controversy we will use the terms ’ex post’ and ’ex ante’. Thanks
are due to Ian Mc Lean for his suggestion.
8These measures10 provide a precise and rather general formulation of the notions of
success and decisiveness based on the primitive ex post notions, with which they are
consistent. If restricted versions of all these measures can be traced a long way back in
the literature on collective decision-making (as will be seen in sections 7 and 8), so far
the probability distribution over the vote conﬁgurations has not been considered as an (in
general) independent input with the generality (and absence of further ingredients) with
which it is considered here. Usually such a distribution of probability is hidden or only
implicit in the deﬁnition of some notions related with ’power’, or burdened with additional
ingredients and assumptions.
Note that strictly speaking i’s decisiveness depends only on the behavior of the other






Observe that for each S, p(S)+p(S\i) is the probability of all voters in S\i voting
’yes’ and those in N\S voting ’no’. In this case, whatever voter i’s vote, she would be
decisive. While Ωi depends on the behavior of all the voters. Thus there is no general
way to derive one concept from the other, the only relation in general being the obvious
Φi(W,p) ≤ Ωi(W,p), as well as Barry’s equation: ’Success’ = ’Decisiveness’ + ’Luck,’
which remains valid in a much more precise and general version. Namely, for any voting
rule W, any probability distribution p, and any voter i,w eh a v e
Ωi(W,p)=Φi(W, p)+Λi(W, p).
5.2 Conditional variants
The precise probabilistic setting in which these notions stand permits to address the ac-
curate formulation of further speciﬁc questions for a given voting situation (W,p). For
instance, if voter i is sure to vote in favor of (or against) the proposal, the conditional
probabilities of success and decisiveness can be evaluated. Alternatively, success and deci-
siveness can be deﬁned conditionally to the acceptance or to the rejection of the proposal.
The corresponding conditional probability gives the answer to each of the following ques-
tions:










9Q.1: Which is voter i’s conditional probability of success (resp., decisiveness), given that
voter i votes in favor (resp., against) of the proposal?
Q.2: Which is voter i’s conditional probability of success (resp., decisiveness), given that
the proposal is accepted (resp., rejected)?





where A may stand for ’voter i is successful/decisive’ and B stands either for ’voter i votes
”yes”/”no”’, or ’the proposal was accepted/rejected’11. This makes eight possible condi-
tional probabilities which answer the previous questions. Of course, the framework allows
for other questions involving diﬀerent conditions (e.g., conditional to ’i and j voted the
same’). We restrict to these ones because, as we will see in section 7, some power measures
proposed in the literature can be reinterpreted as one of these conditional probabilities for
a particular probability distribution. A bit of notation is necessary. We will superindex
the measures -Ωi or Φi - when they represent conditional probabilities. The superindex
’i+’ (resp., ’i−’) will refer to the condition ’given that i votes ”yes”(resp., ”no”)’. So




i , respectively. The superindex
’Acc’( r e s p . ,’ Rej’) will refer to the condition ’given that the proposal is accepted (resp.,







As an illustration, we formulate explicitly two of them. Denoting








Voter i’s conditional probability of being decisive given that voter i votes in favor of the
proposal, is given by:
Φi+







Voter i’s conditional probability of success given that the proposal is accepted, is given
by:
ΩAcc






11Of course, conditional probabilities only make sense if p(B)  =0 . This will be implicitly assumed
whenever we refer to any of these conditional measures.
10The following table summarizes the ten (unconditional and conditional) variants:














They are related by
Ωi(W,p)=γi(p) Ωi+
i (W, p)+( 1− γi(p)) Ωi−
i (W,p),
Φi(W,p)=γi(p) Φi+
i (W, p)+( 1− γi(p)) Φi−
i (W,p), (9)
Ωi(W, p)=α(W,p) ΩAcc




i (W,p)+( 1− α(W,p)) Φ
Rej
i (W,p).
Mind that Prob {i votes ’no’} =1− γi(p), and Prob {rejection} =1− α(W,p).
In section 7 we will see how seven out of these ten variants (eight out of eleven if we
include α(W,p)12) are related with some power indices of which they can be interpreted as
the natural conceptual extension for arbitrary behaviors. In particular the three measures
Φi,Φi+
i , and Φi−
i , or better their particularization for some particular explicit or implicit
probability distribution are some times confused as equivalent, which in general it is not
true. The following proposition characterizes the behaviors for which the three measures
coincide.
Proposition 1 For a distribution of probability p ∈ Pn the three measures Φi(W, p),
Φi+
i (W, p) and Φi−
i (W,p) coincide for every i and every voting rule W, if and only if the
vote of every voter is independent from the vote of the remainder voters.
Proof. First note that the two conditional measures make sense only if the case where
any voter i votes ’yes’ (or ’not’) with probability zero are excluded. Thus, we assume
0 < γi(p) < 1, for all i. Now by (9), if any two measures coincide, the third one will
12In Laruelle and Valenciano (2002) it is shown a general result related to TU games that restricted to
simple games yields an interesting interpretation of α(W, p) as the ’generalized’ potential (or
α(W,p)
γi(p) as the
’traditional’ Hart and Mas-Colell’s (1989) potential).
11coincide too. Thus it is enough to prove that Φi+
i (−,p)=Φi−
i (−,p) for all i if and only if
p satisﬁes the independence condition above. We write γi instead of γi(p)f o rb r i e f .
















p(T) for all S  = ∅,a n da l li ∈ S. Consequently, from formulae (8)
and the similar one giving Φi−
i (W, p)i tf o l l o w si m m e d i a t e l yt h a tΦi+
i (W,p)=Φi−
i (W,p)
for any procedure W.
Necessity: Now assume Φi+
i (W, p)=Φi
i−(W,p) for all i and any procedure W.L e t




1−γip(∅) for all S  = ∅. For it, take the unanim-
ity rule WN = {N}. The coincidence of both measures for this procedure implies
p(N)=
γi
1−γip(N\i) for all i. Now, for any S ⊆ N s.t. s ≥ 2a n da n yi ∈ S, take
W = {T ⊆ N : S\i ⊆ T and t ≥ s}. The coincidence of both measures for this procedure
entails that p(S)=
γi
1−γip(S\i). Finally, taking i’s dictatorship Wi = {T ⊆ N : i ∈ T},
the coincidence of both measures together with the previous equalities yield that p({i})=
γi
1−γip(∅). Thus, we have that p(S)=
γi
1−γip(S\i) for all S  = ∅,a n da l li ∈ S. Then for any
















































Where the last equality results from the denominator being 1 (this, as 0 < γi < 1 for all











(1 − γj) for any S ⊆ N. Thus the vote of every voter is
independent from the vote of the rest.
In other words, this coincidence holds only for the particular class of probabilistic
voting behaviors in which every voter independently votes ’yes’ with a certain probability.
This includes, as we will see, the Banzhaf index but not the Shapley-Shubik index.
Another question is whether diﬀerent behaviors can lead to the same measure of de-
cisiveness. The following proposition gives the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this
to be so for each of the three measures of decisiveness.
Proposition 2 Let p and p  ∈ PN,t h e n
12(i) Φi(W, p)=Φi(W,p ) for all i and any voting rule W if and only if
p (S)=p(S)+( −1)s+1(p(∅) − p (∅)) for all S  = ∅.
(ii) Φi+
i (W,p)=Φi+





1 − p (∅)
for all S  = ∅.
(iii) Φi−
i (W,p)=Φi−





1 − p (N)
for all S  = ∅.
Note that in (ii) (resp., in (iii)) for Φi+
i (resp., Φi−
i )t om a k es e n s ei tm u s tb ea s s u m e d
that for all i, γi(p) > 0( r e s p . ,γi(p) < 1), which entails p(∅) < 1( r e s p . ,p(N) < 1). We omit
the details of the proof, whose basic idea is as follows. For (i) it is easy to see that behavior
inﬂuences decisiveness via the sum of the probabilities of each conﬁguration and the one
resulting from it when a voter changes her vote from ’yes’ to ’no’. Therefore diﬀerent
distributions satisfying this condition lead to the same measure. For (ii) the point is that
what matters for the conditional measures Φi+
i are the probabilities of vote conﬁgurations
where at least one voter votes ’yes’. The probability of a unanimous ’no’ does not aﬀect
these measures, therefore the probability of this conﬁguration can be modiﬁed and re-
scale proportionally the probability of the others without modifying them. Finally, for
(iii), the situation is similar just replacing the conﬁguration ∅ by the conﬁguration N.
Observe that, for any of the three measures, no two diﬀerent probability distributions for
which the unanimous ’no’ (unanimous ’yes’ for Φi−
i ) has zero probability have the same
associated measure.
6 Positive versus normative approach
The basic concepts given by (3) and (4) in Deﬁnition 2, as well as all the conditional vari-
ations of them considered, can in principle be used for a positive or descriptive evaluation
of a voting situation. For such an evaluation the voting rule is not suﬃcient, an estimate
of the voters’ voting behavior is needed too. In our basic formulations this second ingre-
dient is summarized by a probability distribution over vote conﬁgurations. This ’black
box’ can be ﬁlled from available data for empirical or applied purposes, or by enriching
the model for theoretical purposes. In the ﬁrst case, ex ante there is not such a general
thing as ’the best positive or descriptive measure’ of actual or de facto power in any of
the senses speciﬁed so far, beyond the general formulae based on the two inputs. In every
particular real world voting situation all that can be said is that the better the estimate
13of the probability distribution over vote conﬁgurations that best suits the case, the bet-
ter the measure of actual decisiveness. This entails the search of data for an estimate of
this probability distribution over voting conﬁgurations that better summarizes the voters’
behavior13. An interesting approach could be using empiric probabilities based on the fre-
quencies of voting conﬁgurations. At the theoretical level, deﬁnitions (3) and (4), and the
conditional variations considered, provide a basic conceptual set up open to the connection
with more complex models involving voters’ preferences or other contextual information,
shared or not by all voters, or models in which voters have ’spatial preferences’, in which
this probability can be endogenously generated (see e.g., Napel and Widgr´ en (2002) for a
more sophisticated model consistent with this one).
It is worth remarking that the general measures considered so far are conceptually
beyond Garrett and Tsebelis’ criticism of power indices under the basis that the voters’
preferences, and any other relevant contextual information are ignored. To illustrate this
point let us reconsider the example that Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) used to illustrate
their claim. They consider a 7-voters voting rule where a proposal is passed if it has the
support of at least 5. They assume that voters are located on a real line so that only
connected and minimal winning conﬁgurations occur, and all of them are equiprobable.
Under these assumptions, they claim that a ’more realistic power index’ should give 1
15
for voters 1 and 7, 2
15 for voters 2 and 6, and 1
5 for voters 3, 4 and 5, respectively. In fact,




3 if S ∈ {{1,2,3,4,5},{2,3,4,5,6},{3,4,5,6,7}}
0 otherwise.
Thus the probability of being decisive for this voting situation (WGT,p GT), where the
voting rule is WGT = {S : s ≥ 5},i sg i v e nb yΦ(WGT,p GT), that is:
Φ1 = Φ7 =
1
3
, Φ2 = Φ6 =
2
3
, Φ3 = Φ4 = Φ5 =1 .






we get that ˜ Φ is Garrett and Tsebelis’ proposed normalized connected power index.
Thus Garrett and Tsebelis’s little story can be accommodated easily in our conceptual
13An earlier version of this paper raised a sceptical comment about the diﬃculties of assessing the
probabilities of 2
n diﬀerent possible events. Nevertheless in real life, where often only a few conﬁgurations
are likely, such assessements are more or less roughly done all the time. In a formal (though completely
diﬀerent) framework, Calvo and Lasaga (1997) obtained from political analysts an assessment of the
probability of every two parties in the Spanish Parliament to agree.
14framework14. Of course, we do not claim that the simple model presented in this paper
accounts for everything that can be of interest about any real world voting situation. This
point is discussed in the last section.
In opposition to the positive/descriptive point of view considered so far, there is the
normative point of view. This is the case when one is concerned with the normative issues
that arise in the assessment of a voting situation or the design of a voting rule, irrespective
of which voters occupy the seats. For this purpose, the particular personality or preferences
of the voters, that evidently inﬂuences their behavior, should not be taken into account. In
this case we are at a logical deadlock: no measurement seems possible without a probability
distribution over vote conﬁgurations, but a crucial part of the information relevant to
estimate this probability has to be ignored. What can be done? Here only the analyst’s
or the designer’s choice, consistent with the situation and the aim, can solve the deadlock.
This is the point where the meaning of the term ’a priori’, understood as the right amount
of information to be taken into account for normative purposes, is critical. Diﬀerent
authors in diﬀerent cases have used the term with diﬀerent meanings. For instance Owen
(1977, 1982) in the very title of his papers refers to ’a priori unions’, meaning the blocks
formed by voters before casting any vote (see section 8). Calvo and Lasaga (1997) refer
to ’a priori ideological compatibility’ of any two parties. In more general terms Braham
and Steﬀen (2002) argue in support of a notion of ’a prioricity’ that ignores the voters’
preferences but incorporates the ’structure’ that conditions their behavior. In the next
section we examine a particular choice that stands out on its own speciﬁcity.
7 Assessment of the voting rule itself
A way out of the diﬃculty discussed in the last paragraph of the previous section consists
of assuming equally probable all conﬁgurations of votes:
p∗(S): =
1
2n for all conﬁguration S ⊆ N.
As is well-known this is equivalent to assuming that each voter, independently from the
others, votes ’yes’ with probability 1/2, and votes ’no’ with probability 1/2. This choice is
consistent with the most basic normative aim according to which any information beyond
t h er u l ei t s e l fs h o u l db ei g n o r e d . N o t et h a ta l s of r o map o s i t i v ep o i n to fv i e w ,p∗ is
the natural starting point in case of actual absolute ignorance about the voters and the
14Mind that while the vector Φ(W
GT,p
GT) gives every voter’s probability of being decisive in the
decision-making by voting rule W
GT when voters’ behavior is represented by p
GT,i t sn o r m a l i z a t i o nd e -
stroys its interpretation, so that ˜ Φ has no clear meaning.
15context15. Although we do not share the dogmatic view according to which the only
legitimate use of the term ’a priori’ is this radical one, it is clear that this extreme case
deserves attention on its own right. It makes sense when the objective is not to assess a
voting situation, but the voting rule itself.
In fact, as we will presently see, some ’power indices’ can be seen as the particu-
larization of some of the measures introduced in section 5 for this speciﬁc probability
distribution. This is the case of Rae’s (1969) ’expected correspondence between individ-
ual values and collective choices’, the (non normalized) Banzhaf (1965) index and the
Coleman (1971, 1986,) indices, and even the more recent K¨ onig and Br¨ auninger’s (1998)
’inclusiveness’ index. Thus our model provides a common conceptual basis for the inter-
pretation and the normative justiﬁcation of these power indices. But, and this is also
signiﬁcant, not all power indices in the literature ﬁt in this common setting, as we will see
in section 8.
Rae index
Rae (1969) studies the anonymous16 voting rule that maximizes the correspondence
between a single anonymous individual vote and those expressed by collective policy,
assuming that each voter, independently from the others, votes ’yes’ with probability
1/2, and votes ’no’ with probability 1/217. Dubey and Shapley (1979) suggest that the
index can be generalized to any voting rule and for any voter. This leads to what can be










That is, Rae index is but the success (3) for the particular distribution p∗:
Raei(W): =Ωi(W,p∗).
Banzhaf index
Banzhaf’s (1965) original or ’raw’ index to assess the relative (i.e., ratio of) ’power’
(as decisiveness) for a seat i and voting rule W is given by:
15Felsenthal and Machover (1998, p. 38) refer to the so-called ’Principle of Insuﬃcient Reason’ to justisfy
this distribution of probability.
16That is, one in which the winning or losing character of a conﬁguration only depends on its size.
17In fact he makes three assumptions: (i) The probability that one member will support (or oppose) a
proposal is independent of that probability for any other member. (ii) The probability that each member
will support any proposal is exactly one-half, and the probability that he will oppose it is also one-half.
(iii) The probability that no member supports the proposal is zero. But (iii) must be dropped for under
assumptions (i) and (ii), the probability that no one supports the proposal is necessarily 1/2
n.
16rawBzi(W) := number of winning conﬁgurations in which i is decisive,
and Owen (1975) (see also Dubey and Shapley, 1979) proposed the following relativization
of this index as a ratio
Bzi(W)=
number of winning conﬁgurations in which i is decisive
total number of voting conﬁgurations containing i
.
A sav o t i n gc o n ﬁguration containing i means one in which i votes ’yes’, it can be easily
seen that Bzi(W)=Φi+




This provides three diﬀerent interpretations of the Banzhaf index as an expectation
of being decisive, and inverting the point of view, Φi, Φi+
i ,a n dΦi−
i are three diﬀerent
extensions of the Banzhaf index for arbitrary voting behaviors.
Coleman indices
Coleman (1971, 1986) deﬁnes, also in terms of ratios, three diﬀerent indices. The
’power of a collectivity to act’, that measures the easiness to make decisions by means of
av o t i n gr u l eW, given by the ratio
A(W)=
number of winning conﬁgurations
total number of voting conﬁgurations
.
Voter i’s Coleman index ’to prevent action’ (ColP
i ) is given by the ratio
ColP
i (W)=
number of winning conﬁgurations in which i is decisive
total number of winning conﬁgurations
.
While voter i’s Coleman index ’to initiate’ action (ColI
i)i sg i v e nb yt h er a t i o
ColI
i(W)=
number of losing conﬁgurations in which i is decisive
total number of losing conﬁgurations
.
Observe that the only input necessary to determine any of these three indices is the
voting rule: no distribution of probability enters explicitly their deﬁnitions. But reinter-
preting them in probabilistic terms, the implicit assumption behind these indices is that
all vote conﬁgurations are equally probable. Then we have the following conclusions about
the meaning of the Coleman indices:











K¨ onig-Br¨ auninger’s inclusiveness index
Finally, recently K¨ onig and Br¨ auninger (1998) deﬁne voter i’s ’inclusiveness’ as the
ratio of winning conﬁgurations containing i, that for a voting rule W is given by:
KBi(W)=
number of winning conﬁgurations containing i
total number of winning conﬁgurations
.
Again a notion that can be generalized to arbitrary voting behaviors as ΩAcc
i (W,p),




The following table summarizes the relations of these ’power indices’, some of them
already classical, and the general model presented in this paper. Table 1, for the probability
distribution p∗ that assigns the same probability to all voting conﬁgurations, becomes
Condition: none i votes ’yes’ i votes ’no’ acceptance rejection
Success Ωi = Raei Ωi+
i Ωi−
i ΩAcc
i = KBi Ω
Rej
i
Decisiveness Φi = Bzi Φi+
i = Bzi Φi−







Inverting the point of view, the functions dependent on the voting situation (W,p):
Φi, Φi+
i , Φi−
i , α, ΦAcc
i , Φ
Rej
i , Ωi and ΩAcc
i , for arbitrary probability distributions, can be
seen as the natural positive/descriptive generalizations of the purely normative Banzhaf’s,
Coleman’s, Rae’s and K¨ onig-Br¨ auninger’s indices.
Equalities (10) and (11) show clearly the diﬀerence between the Coleman indices and
the Banzhaf index, often mistakenly confused. Both measure decisiveness assuming all
vote conﬁgurations equally probable. But Banzhaf index measures decisiveness non con-
ditionally (or conditionally to i’s positive or negative vote indistinctly), while Coleman
indices measure decisiveness conditionally to the acceptance (ColP
i (W)) or the rejection
(ColI
i(W)) of the proposal. The origin of the confusion between these indices is due to the
fact that their normalizations coincide, giving rise to the so-called ’Banzhaf-Coleman’ in-
dex. In formula, denoting h x the normalization of any vector x ∈ Rn,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g






18This coincidence only advocates against the common practice of normalizing these in-
dices, for, along with the loss of information this normalization entails, it makes them lose
their probabilistic interpretation. Mind that in general for arbitrary probability distribu-
tions the normalizations of Φi(W,p), ΦAcc
i (W,p), and Φ
Rej
i (W,p)d on o tc o i n c i d e .
Note also that the relation that Dubey and Shapley (1979) establish between the Rae
index and the Banzhaf index relies on the assumption that all vote conﬁgurations are
equiprobable18. As mentioned in section 5, in general success and decisiveness are not
directly related.
8 Other power indices and game theoretic related notions
In this section we examine whether other power indices, as well as some related game
theoretic notions, ﬁt or not into the model. That is, whether they can be interpreted as
the probability of being decisive for any probability distribution.
Shapley-Shubik index






(n − s)!(s − 1)!
n!
.
As the Banzhaf index, it can be seen as a probabilistic measure of decisiveness, either
unconditional (Φi(-,p)) or conditional (Φi+
i (-,p)o rΦi−
i (-,p)), but unlike the Banzhaf
index, this is only so for diﬀerent probability distributions over vote conﬁgurations in
every case.
Proposition 3 (i) Φi(W, p)=Shi(W) for all i and any voting rule W,i fa l lt h ev o t e
conﬁgurations’ sizes (from 0 to n) are equally probable, and all conﬁgurations of the same







 for all S ⊆ N.
(ii) Φi+
i (W, p)=Shi(W) for all i and any W ∈VRN,i fac o n ﬁguration ( = ∅) is chosen
like this: a size s from 1 to n is chosen with probability inversely proportional to s,t h e n











 for any S  = ∅.
18See also Straﬃn, Davis and Brams (1981).
19(iii) Φi−
i (W, p)=Shi(W) for all i and any W ∈VRN, if a conﬁguration ( = N)i s
chosen like this: a size s from 0 to n − 1 is chosen with probability inversely proportional











 for any S  = N.
Mind that all the ’if”s in Proposition 3 would become ’if and only if’, if in the three cases
the speciﬁc probability distribution is replaced by the family of probability distributions
that yield the same Φi, Φi+
i ,a n dΦi−
i (for all i) respectively, that can easily be generated by
means of Proposition 2. Note that the stories for the probability distributions in (ii) and
(iii) look rather unfamiliar. But, although the Shapley-Shubik index (as some cooperative
game theoretic ’solutions’, as we presently will see) ﬁt as a particular case of any of the
three variations of decisiveness according to the approach considered here, we cannot ﬁnd
any convincing arguments from a normative point of view in favor of any of these very
particular probability distributions, and consequently in favor of the Shapley-Shubik index
as a normative measure of decisiveness in the sense considered here. As to its suitability
in voting situations in which, underneath the voting surface, some ’spoils’ were at stake,
so that the so-called ’P-power’ (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) were the relevant issue,
we refer the reader to the concluding remarks.
Other power indices
Deegan and Packel (1978) and Holler and Packel (1983) introduced two new indices
that rely on the concept of minimal winning conﬁguration (m. w. c.) of votes. A winning
conﬁguration S is minimal if it does not contain properly any other winning conﬁguration.
Let M(W)a n dMi(W) denote the sets of all m. w. c., and the set of m. w. c. containing
i, respectively, and let m(v)a n dmi(W), respectively, denote their number. For a voting









Deegan and Packel (1978, p. 114) justify their index on three assumptions regarding
the behavior of the voters that in terms of the model considered here can be reworded as
follows: Only minimal winning conﬁgurations will emerge, all of them are equally probable,
and the members of the resulting conﬁguration will divide the ’spoils’ equally.’
Holler and Packel (1983) argue that the third assumption implies a ’private good
approach’, and opposes a ’public good’ approach, substituting the third assumption by
this: All voters in a minimal winning coalition get the undivided coalition value. Then we
20get what Laruelle (1998) refers to as the non-normalized Holler-Packel index, that in the






















In fact, the ﬁrst two assumptions (common to both indices) specify the following




m(W) if S is a minimal winning conﬁguration
0o t h e r w i s e .
Thus for this probability distribution results:
Proposition 4 For every voting rule W, the non normalized Holler-Packel is given by
HPi(W)=Φi(W, pW) (for the above described pW)19.
But observe that, properly speaking, not even the non-normalized Holler-Packel index
ﬁts into the general deﬁnition (4) of decisiveness because the probability distribution is
determined by the rule itself. Note also that the normalization that yields the Holler-Packel
index destroys this probabilistic interpretation. With respect to the Deegan-Packel index,
it should be stressed that the ’distribution of cake’ ingredient of the third assumption is
completely inconsistent with the approach considered here. The same can be said about
Holler and Packel’s reinterpretation of the cake as a public good.
Laver (1978) criticizes the power indices and claims that: ’it is clear that a party’s
power will be greater if it is the only destroyer of a particular coalition than if that honor
is shared with a number of others.’ In response to Laver’s argument, Johnston (1978)
proposes a modiﬁcation of the normalized Banzhaf index. Namely, if κ(S) denotes the









19As M. Machover pointed out, alternatively the non normalized Holler-Packel can be accomodated in
this model as the conditional measure of decisiveness under p
∗, for the condition ’given that a m.w.c. will




21We see no way to provide any meaning to this index from the point of view provided by
our model.
Coalitional values and other game-theoretic extensions
A coalitional value is an extension of the concept of value for TU games in which,
apart from the game itself, a coalition structure is taken also as an input. A coalitional
structure in a TU game is a partition of the set of players into disjoint coalitions that
is interpreted as a form of ex ante union into subgroups of players. Owen (1977, 1982)
proposed extensions of the Shapley value (1977) and of the Banzhaf index (1982) (of the
’Banzhaf-Coleman index’ in his terms) to these situations. In the context of voting, ex
ante unions arise naturally (parties, blocks, etc.). Again our general formulation provides
a framework to deal with these situations in which a coalition structure constraints the
vote conﬁgurations. The natural treatment consists of restricting the class of probability
distributions to those that assign probability zero to those conﬁgurations that ’break’
any coalition in this structure. Note that from a positive/descriptive point of view any
further narrowing of the class of probability distributions could only be justiﬁed if based
on actual data about the situation under consideration. From this point of view, the
mechanical restriction to simple games of any of the coalitional values in the literature of
TU games, based on purely axiomatic grounds, as a probabilistic measure of decisiveness
lacks justiﬁcation. In view of the lack of compelling arguments in support of the Shapley-
Shubik index form the point of view of this approach, we will not deal with the coalitional
extensions of this index. Nevertheless, we have the following elegant statement relating
Owen’s (1982) coalitional value and ex ante decisiveness.
Proposition 5 Let Ψi(W,B) denote the Owen’s (1982) coalitional index of a voter i ∈




j denotes the distribution that assigns the same probability to all conﬁgurations
that do not break any Bk  = Bj, and zero to those which break any Bk  = Bj.
Note that Ψi(W,B)o n l yp a r t l yﬁts general formulation (4) because the probability
distribution in Φi(W,pB
j ) depends on which block voter i belongs to. Namely, for any
i ∈ Bj it is assumed that all blocks but Bj act as blocks (i.e., the vote does not split within
any of these blocks) and every of these blocks votes ’yes’ with probability 1/2 and ’no’
with probability 1/2. While within Bj all vote conﬁgurations are equally probable. Thus,
we have again a conditional variation of Φi(W, p∗), but a more complex one, as dependent
on B and on which block the voter belongs to. This provides an interesting example of
22an ’a priori’ (according Owen’s own terms) assessment in which some information (not
the same for voters in diﬀerent blocks!) beyond the rule itself is taken into account: the
coalitional structure. But in a very particular way: it is taken as part of the environment
of a voter in a block (all the others will act as blocks) to assess the a priori decisiveness
of every voter within her block given that context.
Finally, there are a variety of ’solution’ concepts in cooperative game theory, as semi-
values (Weber, 1979, 1988) and weak (weighted or not) semivalues (Calvo and Santos,
2000) that can be seen as generalizations of the concept of power index when restricted
to simple games. All these notions were introduced axiomatically by weakening in diﬀer-
ent ways diﬀerent characterizations of the Shapley value. Semivalues result by dropping
eﬃciency, and include the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices as the most distinguished
members. Thus, they can be seen as the family of decisiveness measures (sharing the
properties shared by the two most popular indices, ’anonymity’ among them) that depend
on the structure of the game (i.e., the voting rule). This was already suggested by We-
ber, (1979) (see also Laruelle and Valenciano (2001b) and Carreras, Freixas and Puente
(2002)). We have the following result20
Proposition 6 All the three measures Φi(−,p), Φi+
i (−,p) and Φi−
i (−,p) (i =1 ,2,..,n):
(i) Become semivalues if and only if p is such that the probability of a conﬁguration
depends only on its size. Moreover, all regular semivalues are generated by Φi+
i (−,p) for
p’s in this family of probability distributions.
(ii) Become weak semivalues if for any two voters the probability of voting ’yes’ is the
same, i.e., γi(p)=γj(p) for all i,j. And all weak semivalues are generated by Φi+
i (−,p)
for p’s in this family.
(iii) Are weighted weak semivalues, and the whole family of weighted weak semivalues
is generated by Φi+
i (−,p) for diﬀerent p’s.
9 Comparison with other probabilistic models
Owen’s (1975, 1988) multilinear extensions can be interpreted as a probabilistic model
in which every voter independently from the others’ behavior votes ’yes’ with a certain
probability. This particular class of probabilistic behaviors has been characterized in
Proposition 1, and as has been pointed out is a particular case within the model considered
here in which correlation is also admitted.
Ac o m p a r i s o nw i t hS t r a ﬃn’s (1977, 1982, 1988) model as well as with Dubey, Neyman
and Weber’s (1981) extension to semivalues is interesting here. Straﬃn (1977, 1982, 1988)
20See Laruelle and Valenciano (2002) for a similar result on the more general domain of TU games.
23proposes the following probabilistic model. Let N = {Nj}j=1,2,..,m be a partition of N
into m disjoint subsets, and denote M = {1,2,..,m}, and nj the cardinal of Nj.L e t
t =( t1,..,t m) ∈ [0,1]
m . Assume that for every j =1 ,2,..,m, every voter in Nj votes
’yes’ with probability tj and ’no’ with probability (1 − tj). For every S ⊆ N, denote






j (1 − tj)nj−sj.
Now assume that each tj is chosen independently from a probability distribution ξj on
[0,1], and denote ξ := (ξ1,..,ξm). Straﬃn considers three special cases in which all ξk
are the uniform distribution on [0,1], and, respectively, m = 1 (’homogeneity’); m = n
(’independence’); and 1 <m<n(’partial homogeneity’).
In the most general case, i.e., for 1 ≤ m ≤ n and arbitrary probability measures ξk’s,
the probability of voter i ’aﬀecting the outcome’ of a decision by a voting rule W,i fi ∈ Mj,

















k (1 − tk)nk−sk dξ1(t1)...dξm(tm). (12)
As is well-known, under ’independence’ this probability coincides with the Banzhaf
index, while under ’homogeneity’ coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index. The point is
this: which is the relationship between Straﬃn’s model and the one considered here? Is
Straﬃn’s more or less general? The answer is given by the following proposition that
establishes the relation between (4) and Straﬃn’s most general formula (12). Let p(N,ξ)
denote the resulting probability distribution over vote conﬁgurations in the general case











j (1 − tj)nj−sj dξ1(t1)...dξm(tm). (13)
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 7 For any partition N = {Nj}j∈M of N,a n da n yM-vector of probability








24Proof. Assume if i ∈ Mj, then observe that in formula (12),
t
sj−1





k (1 − tk)nk−sk
is the probability of the event: all voters in S\i vote ’yes’ and all in N\S vote ’no’, if
for every k =1 ,2,..,m, every voter in Nk votes ’yes’ with probability tk and ’no’ with
probability (1 − tk). But mind that if S is winning and S\i is not, i would be decisive











k (1 − tk)nk−sk = Φi(W,p(N,t)),
and the ﬁrst equality is proved. Now by permuting addition an integration in (12), and























And the proof is complete.
Thus we have the following conclusion: in strict terms the model considered here is
simpler and more general than Straﬃn’s.I t i s simpler for its formulation requires only
the elementary notion of probability distribution over a ﬁnite set of events (i.e., a discrete
random variable: the voting conﬁguration), while Straﬃn’s model is more complicated for
it involves a ’double randomization,’ that is, a (non discrete) distribution of probability
over distributions of probability. And our model is more general in a precise sense from the
previous proposition: whatever the probability distributions ξj’s, Straﬃnm o d e lg e n e r a t e s
a probability distribution over vote conﬁgurations. That is, it provides a way of putting
something (i.e., p(N,ξ)) within our black box p. But the reciprocal is not true: not all voting
behaviors considered in our model can be generated from Straﬃn’s (i.e., from (13))21.
Dubey, Neyman and Weber’s (1981) extend Straﬃn’s homogeneity result to all semival-
ues, and Einy (1987) proves it holds also on the domain of simple games. They (and Einy
for simple games) show that all semivalues emerge from formula (12), in the case m =1
21For instance, let n =3 ,a n dp such that p({1,2})=p({1,3})=
1
2,a n dp(S) = 0, otherwise. This
behavior (a ’boss’ that controls the agenda and half the times has the support of one of two voters always
holding opposite views, and half the times that of the other) cannot be generated from Straﬃn’s model.
25and for diﬀerent probability measures ξ(t)o n[ 0 ,1]. More precisely there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the set of semivalues and the set of probability measures on [0,1].
Compare the simplicity of the probabilistic model provided by Φi+
i (W,p)( i =1 ,2,..,n),
that according to Proposition 6-(i) generates all semivalues, and the unnecessary sophis-
tication of the alluded particularization of (12).
10 Concluding remarks
The simple model presented in this paper provides a common basis to reinterpret power
indices as well as some game theoretic ’cooperative solutions’ that can be seen as extensions
of this notion. We have deliberately avoided as much as possible the terms ’power’ or
’voting power’, and use preferentially the more neutral and precise ’decisiveness’ and
’success’ to avoid any argument about the use of words, and also to emphasize the relevance
of both notions in connection with the voters’ role in voting situations. The results of this
r e e x a m i n a t i o ni nt h el i g h to ft h i sm o d e lc a nb es u m m a r i z e dl i k et h i s :
1. From the unifying point of view provided by this probabilistic model some power
indices but not all, namely, Banzhaf’s, Coleman’s, Rae’s and K¨ onig-Br¨ auninger’s indices,
once adequately reformulated and generalized, have a precise interpretation as probabilistic
measures of decisiveness or success under diﬀerent conditional constraints. All these indices
can be jointly justiﬁed as assessments o ft h ev o t i n gr u l ei t s e l fo nt h es a m en o r m a t i v e
grounds, as based on the same probability distribution that assigns the same probability
to all vote conﬁguration. But mind that there is no conﬂict among these indices, for they
all are based on the same model, they just measure diﬀerent features. Banzhaf’s seems
the most preeminent, but those of Coleman deserve more attention than has usually been
paid to them22.
2. The same framework that supports the previous claim makes clear the lack of
grounds to attach any positive or descriptive value to assess actual voting situations to
any of these power indices (apart from the case of absolute ignorance about the voters and
the context beyond the rule itself). But, on the other hand, this framework suggests a
natural conceptual extension of these power indices to positive or descriptive assessments
when this particular probability distribution is replaced by the one that best ﬁts the speciﬁc
real-world situation at hand, as well as to other normative-oriented measures if additional
information were considered adequate to be reﬂected in the probability distribution.
3. Some other power indices (Shapley-Shubik, non normalized Holler-Packel) as well
22The importance given by the negotiators in Nice 2000 to the capacity of blocking (see Galloway, 2001)
seems to corroborate this claim. The problem of forthcoming enlargements is attracting attention to
Coleman’s ’power of a collectivity to act’.
26as some game-theoretic extensions (Owen’s coalitional extension of Banzhaf index, as well
as semivalues and weighted weak semivalues) ﬁt into the model (only partially in some
cases), but for probability distributions diﬃcult to justify. Other power indices (Deagan-
Packel, Johnston) cannot be accommodated within the model in no way. In either case
this seems to corroborate the lack of clear normative arguments in support of any of them
as measures of decisiveness. The possible positive/descriptive meaning in a completely
diﬀerent sense of any of these notions in certain situations is not discussed here, for it is
beyond the objectives of this work.
4. This raises the question of alternative meanings of the terms ’power’ or ’voting
power’, to which the latter indices seem to refer on insuﬃciently clear grounds. There
is Felsenthal and Machover’s (1998) obscure notion of ’P-power’ associated to a situation
in which the main ingredient of a voting situation seems to be the distribution of some
’spoils’. But as far as we know there is no coherent general formulation of this notion
yet. So far the term ’P-power’ only covers an insuﬃciently speciﬁed notion, although it
possibly points out to a real ’hole’ in the theory.
5. Points 1 and 2 do not mean that power indices exhaust what is to be said about
voting situations. Not in the least. There is much more to say from a positive point of view
about real world voting situations than what power indices or their positive extensions may
say. After all, success and decisiveness notions refer to the formal role played by voters in
voting situations. That this is not all that is to be said about voting situations is obvious,
and is corroborated by the abundant criticisms of power indices, however ill-founded these
criticisms may often be. The proliferation of alternative models has evidently to do with
the insuﬃciencies of power indices. It is worth remarking the absence of any explicit
genuine game theoretic ingredient in the whole approach developed here. Of course, any
real world voting situation involves rational interaction of the voters, which interests game
theory. But in this model this game-like background is only implicit within the black box
summarizing the voters behavior. There seems to be still much to be said about voting
situations from a genuine game theoretic point of view, beyond what power indices can
tell.
6. In comparison with other probabilistic models of the voters’ behavior the one
considered here seems at once simpler and more general. Our model includes Straﬃn’s as
a particular way among others of ﬁlling the voters’ behavior’s black box, and it is deﬁnitely
simpler. The sophistication of Straﬃn’s model with its double randomization has caused
a great fascination over social scientists, for it provides a suggestive model which in two
’extreme’ particular cases yields the two most popular power indices, Shapley-Shubik’s
(homogeneity case) and Banzhaf’s (independence case), and allows for ’tailored power
27indices’ combining features of both (partial homogeneity case) (Weber 1988, p. 78). But
in our view it oﬀers a false way of eclectically escaping the unanswered criticisms about
the Shapley-Shubik index by Banzhaf (1965) and Coleman (1986). The simpler model
discussed here makes evident instead the diﬀerent normative worth of both indices as
measures of decisiveness, and provides a very simple framework in which a variety of
notions can be coherently integrated.
7. In two previous papers we revised the axiomatic foundations of the Shapley-Shubik
index and the Banzhaf index, and of the semivalues (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2001a, 2000,
2001b). Perhaps we have done our way in the wrong order, starting with the axiomatic
foundations and only then reexamining the probabilistic nature of the concepts involved.
As a conclusion of this tour we fully agree with Straﬃn’s (1988) words: ’I believe that
it [the axiomatic approach] is less eﬀective than the probability approach in giving clear
heuristic advice about which power index is applicable to which voting situation.’
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